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MORAL ASPECTS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
By MORRIS R. COHEN t
I-N passing moral judgments, as we all sooner or later inevitably do, in
regard to legal and other human arrangements, we generally oscillate
between the appeal to self-evident principles and the appeal to the obvious
demands of the specific situation before us. This seems a highly un-
satisfactory procedure to those who feel that certainty must be found in
one or other terminus, else all our moral judgments fail for lack of an
assured support. This Article is based on the view that such oscillation
is under certain logical precautions and scientific systematization the only
proper procedure, that to trust rigid principles regardless of specific con-
sequences makes for inhuman absolutism, while to rely on nothing but
the feeling of the moment leads to brutal anarchy. Consider the ethical
atomists who think that life breaks itself up into a number of separate
autonomous situations, each immediately revealing its own good or
proper solution to our conscience, intuition, or intuitive reason, intelli-
gence or common sense. When these moralists are confronted by a chal-
lenge to any of their particular judgments, they generally adduce some
reason or at least cite an analogous case, thus involving emplicitly or im-
plicitly an appeal to some determining principle more abstract and wider
than the specific case before them. On the other hand, those who rely
on principles to decide specific cases do, and have to, defend these prin-
ciples by showing that they lead to the proper consequences. By a con-
sideration of some of the ethical problems of the criminal law, I wish to
illustrate the truth that the procedure from principles to facts and from
facts to principles, without assuming either to be absolute or unques-
tionable, does not at all lead to complete moral nihilism, but rather clarifies
the process of building a systematic view of what the law should do,
even though it tolerates a certain amount of probabilism and pluralism
in taking into account the wide variations of social conditions and senti-
ments.
1'Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago; Professor Emeritus, The College
of the City of New York.
The substance of this Article was given as a lecture on the Fenton Foundation at
the University of Buffalo in 1934. I regret that the publication of this and of the cther
two lectures on Law and Justice has been unavoidably delayed.
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In the law school's curriculum and in the textbooks, the criminal law
appears as a distinct and strictly delimited province; and practitioners
generally leave it to a separate branch of their profession, by no means
the highest in income and prestige. But if you ask the man in the street
what he understands by law he will generally mention the prohibition
against theft, murder or some other punishable offense. As in other cases
the layman, while devoid of well-defined and properly elaborated ideas,
still touches the root of the matter. The criminal law may properly be
viewed not only as a branch but also as a basic phase of the whole legal
system.
Jurists often distinguish the criminal from the civil law on the ground
that the former is concerned with punishments for violation of those
rules of public order to which normal people naturally conform, while
the civil law is concerned only with determining the rights of the parties
in private transactions. In fact, however, not only does the criminal law
today regulate all sorts of private business, but all legal provisions (at
least in a modern state) have at their back an enforcing machinery that
operates through some system of penalties. Consider for instance such
requirements as that certain agreements must be in writing or involve
a "consideration," that a will must have two or three witnesses, that a
valid protest of a note must be within a certain time, or that one may
legally charge an interest rate of six per cent. Anyone who ignores these
provisions exposes himself to the penalty of losing certain advantages
- a loss which may be far more severe than many of the fines for public
disorder or for various misdemeanors. A law permitting a man to transfer
his property by a will is significant only when the beneficiary legatee or
devisee can invoke the penal machinery of the state against those who
would deprive him of possession. All laws as to property, contract or
personal rights may thus be viewed as specifications within the criminal
law, specifications as to when the public force will be brought into play
to punish non-obedience to its prescriptions.
There are doubtless obvious differences between the extreme penalty
of death or life imprisonment for certain felonies, and the penalties which
support the civil law. But it is well to remember that imprisonment for
debt has not yet been completely abolished; that the triple damages of
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act may deprive you of your home; and when
you happen to be put into jail for not obeying an injunction which de-
prives you of most elementary civil rights, the actual effects on you and
your dependents are not much different than if you were punished for
committing a crime.
It is sometimes asserted that the civil law protects the private interests
of individuals while the criminal law protects the interests of the state
or community. But this contrast is of little value. I do not wish to
dispute the fact that the interest in preventing sacrilege or other grave
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public danger was one of the origins of criminal procedure, and that
offences against the king or government have been and still are gener-
ally the most severely punished. But it is hardly necessary to call attention
to the vital interests of the state not only in protecting but in promoting
private industry and commerce from which it derives its support. Surely
no interest of the state is so dear to it as the collection of taxes. Yet
the non-payment of a real-estate tax is not always a crime. An absolute
differentiation between the substance of the criminal and of the civil
law is indeed clearly impossible so long as the same act may be the basis
of either a civil suit or a criminal prosecution. The difference here clearly
resolves itself into one of procedure.
In the United States today, it seems very easy to distinguish between
criminal and civil procedure on the ground that in the former some state
official is in duty bound to prosecute, whereas a civil action is brought
by a private individual acting at his pleasure. We must add however that
state officials are also bound to bring certain civil suits, and in England
the attorney general may intervene in tort cases between private parties.
This is not to deny that there are today some differences between civil
and criminal procedure, e.g., the one in regard to the burden of proof.
But it is well to remember that these differences are far from prevailing
in all legal systems and are apt to appear more important in theory than
in the actual practice of our jury trials. In any case, up to the second
decade of the nineteenth century the common law allowed a private action
or "appeal" for murder and other injuries.
These considerations are not intended to deny that legislatures and
courts can, do, and should call certain acts criminal and provide some
distinctive procedures for dealing with them. The general feeling of
security demands that everyone know, with a fair degree of certainty,
what is and what is not criminal. The fear that some innocent act may
be branded as criminal is as horrible as the older paralyzing fear of
unconscious unintentional sin. What I wish to insist on is that the
criminal law is an integral part of the legal system and is subject to the
same considerations which do and should influence the whole. M1ore
specifically, the criminal law cannot be distinguished from the rest by
any difference of moral principle. Some crimes, to be sure, are shocking;
but there are many crimes that are felt to be much less reprehensible than
many outrageous forms of injustice, cruelty or fraud, which the la,
does not punish at all, or else makes their perpetrator liable to money
damages in a civil suit. It is well to remember that Moses murdered an
Egyptian and fled the country, that Socrates was, by a majority of his
fellow citizens that voted, found guilty of a crime, and that George
Washington and others would have been treated as criminals if the Amer-
ican Revolution had been as unsuccessful as was the Scotch rebellion
under Sir AWilliam Wallace. Those who, like Kant, regard obedience to
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the law as an absolute duty, must logically deny the moral right of any
revolution. But this cannot be carried out consistently, since most, if
not all, established governments, even the Constitution of the United
States, have arisen out of revolutions and military conquest. Some dim,
uncomfortable perception of this may be responsible for Kant's remark-
able prohibition of any inquiry as to how the existing government acquired
its authority.
An adequate discussion of justice in the criminal law must therefore
deal with all the ethical issues of the law generally, such as the principle
of equality, the adjustment of conflicting interests, or the relation be-
tween respect for personality and the demands of social responsibility
and solidarity. But this Article will be limited to a few questions that
are in the forefront of current discussion as to the criminal law.
WHAT IS A CRIME?
With this question, we are at once plunged into an ancient and per-
sistent controversy. On one hand, we have the legalists who urge that
any act or omission is a crime when, and only when, it is declared to
be such by the legislative power or by those who speak with the authority
of the law; an act may be sinful, immoral or contrary to the public good,
but it is not a crime unless it is legally so declared. On the other hand,
we have those who claim this view to be superficial, and who insist that
no legislature can or should treat anything as a crime unless it is so in
fact or in the nature of things. This issue dates back to the old Greek
controversy of the fifth century B.C. between those who saw everything
determined by nature and those who pressed the claims of convention
or human legislation. To Aristotle may be traced the classical com-
promise of distinguishing between those acts which are crimes by nature
(mala per se) and are prohibited among all peoples, and those others
(mnala prohibita) which are prohibited only in certain places by special
legislation. This view has been largely influential in molding the classical
doctrine of natural rights in the criminal as well as in other branches of
the law. In point of fact, however, no one has ever made a critical cata-
logue of the acts which have actually been prohibited by all peoples at
all times. Almost all those who insist that there are minala per se put into
that class those acts which in an undefined way seem to them to be shock-
ing. But they do not give any clear criterion by which to judge what acts
should thus be included and what acts should be excluded from the cate-
gory of crime.
THE TRADITIONAL MORALISTIC VIEWS OF CRIME
The oldest traditions view crime as a violation of some eternal law set
by the gods, nature or reason. These find expression in two forms, the
theologic and the rationalist (more properly intuitive). Both have the
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advantage over the positivist that they do not have to use empirical evi-
dence to establish absolute distinctions between what is and what is no t
properly a crime.
1. The theologic point of viczv. This is the older and still the most
widespread. It regards the criminal law, and indeed all law, as divinely
ordained for all time by Manu or by Zeus, given by Jahweh to 'Moses
or to Kohammed by Allah. Without entering into any theologic con-
troversy, it may be granted as an historic fact that communities as a rule
do not allow any one who pleases to decide what acts the divine will has
ordained as criminal. That is a function left in fact to some recognized
authorities, e.g., priests, religiously trained judges, scribes who interpret
certain texts, or the like. When the judgment of these authorities can
in any way be questioned, there is some attempt to justify it on the
basis of reason and human history. Thus great moralists of the Catholic
church, such as St. Thomas, are not willing to rest the distinction between
what are and what are not crimes on mere authority. The divine Will is
not despotically arbitrary, but is viewed as essentially rational and just.
Hence in practice, theologic moralists appeal also to a rationalist view
of human nature and experience.
Of course, there are theologians who insist that the essence of crime
is the violation of the divine will, and that our frail human reason can-
not determine what is just or unjust for the Perfect Whole. Mankind
is quite accustomed to double standards of morality, different for men
and women, for the state and individual, and for divine and human per-
sons. Thus it is not wrong for Jahweh to harden Pharaoh's heart or to
send a lying spirit to Ahab in order to punish him. It is not even wrong
to put an evil design into David's heart in order to punish innocent chil-
dren of Israel by either killing them by the plague or else depriving them
of their parents. But the persistent efforts to explain such incidents and
to justify the ways of God show a general disinclination to view God's
law or will as entirely devoid of what seems to us rational or just.
Moreover, not all sins or violations of God's law are treated by the-
ologians as crimes. Many evil acts are left to the direct punishment of
the divine power here or hereafter, e.g., covetousness, sex relations that
are prohibited by the divine but not by human law, uncharitable attitudes
to others, or failure to honor our parents. The Catholic church, claiming
divine authority, does not today urge that the state make it a penal offense
to disbelieve the dogma of trans-substantiation or of the immaculate con-
ception of the Virgin Mary, or to hold those views as to the relation of
the Holy Ghost to the Father and Son which make heretics of all the
Greek orthodox. If blasphemy is still a crime in some of our states, it
is defended on the alleged ground of protecting the public peace. Suicide
is very often viewed as a direct violation of divine law. But few care
to see criminal punishment meted out to one who has been unsuccessful
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in his attempt at it; and we may suspect that when suicide was treated
as a felony, the fact that this deprived the heirs of the felon of his
property and gave it to the king or church was an important motive or
factor in the case.
2. The point of view of moral intuition. Of those who have attempted
to give us an absolute moral basis for a penal code, Kant is the foremost.
He rejects the claims of all authority, secular or sacred, as inconsistent
with the autonomy of the free will in ethical relations. The universal
principle of all moral conduct, the categorical imperative to live so that
the maxim of our action can become a principle of universal legislation,
is not the source but rather a formula for what conscience, moral faith
or "practical reason" immediately dictates as our duty in any specific
case. In the end Kant falls back on the assumption that just as our moral
conscience tells us that "Thou shalt not kill" is an absolute duty for the
individual, so is "You shall kill the murderer" an equally absolute duty
for the community. If a society is to be dissolved, the last murderer
must be executed, else the blood of the victim will be on the heads of
those who fail to do so.
While the Kantian theory is fairly close to the popular conscience,
which often regards the prevailing mores as eternal laws of nature and
reason, it fails as a guide in the determination of what specific acts are
or ought to be treated as criminal.
Not all violations of moral laws are crimes (e.g., lying). But why is
not truth-telling as important for the preservation of the moral order
as the protection of property? We all agree that murder should be a
crime. But such agreement is purely verbal unless we are agreed as to
what is murder. Surely, not all instances of killing can be regarded as
criminal, even on Kantian grounds. What distinction does he offer
between excusable or even commendable homicide, and murder? No
one today regards it as criminal to kill a man in self-defense. But the
line between justifiable and unjustifiable fear of attack varies and is
somewhat arbitrarily fixed by law. In international relations, it is hope-
less to fix a sharp line between an offensive and defensive war, even
though in extreme cases the distinction is clear even to those not involved
in the combat.
None of us think of the official executioner as a murderer. Though
he is obviously not of the highest dignity, and we may not agree with
De Maistre that the whole state rests on him, he is still a public servant.
Nihilists who condemned and executed some of the brutal underlings
of the czar were branded as murderers by his advisors who ordered, one
Sunday morning, the shooting of a number of people that came to pre-
sent a petition. Shall we say that the moral conscience of mankind is
clear as to who in these instances was guilty of murder? The soldiers
who kill in war are brave heroes, and on both sides they are said to be
[Vol. 49: 987
THE CRIMINAL LAW
defending their country. But may not their obedience to their officers
make wars of unjust aggression possible?
I am not arguing that there is no such thing as morally revolting
criminal murder, simply because in the nature of things there is not any
sharp line to define it. That would be like arguing that there is no differ-
ence between day and night because there is no sharp line but rather a
twilight zone between them. But I am calling attention to the inadequacy
of the intuitionists' account which supposes that the common conscience
has a clear and universally acknowledged answer as to when an act is
or is not criminal.
Similar considerations hold in regard to theft. Apart from existing
law, it is hard to say what does and what does not morally belong to
another. Especially is this true in modern society when no man can
point to anything and say, "This is exclusively the product of my own
work in which I received no help from others." For, in fact, the author
of a book, or the farmer who raises crops, has been supported by others
during his work, and the relative value of his services is largely deter-
mined by the conditions created by the legal system. The notion of theft
is relatively clear if it denotes taking something in a way that the law
prohibits. But on purely moral grounds, apart from the law, it is by no
means clear. Is it immoral for a manufacturer to copy the brilliant ideas
that his rival has developed? If the design of a dress should be made
property by law on the analogy of copyright, then imitating it will be-
come theft. Among many primitive people there is no sense of private
property in food. But it is a grave theft for one man to sing the personal
song of another. Before the copyright laws, there was no conception
of property in the literary composition itself. But when the legal rules
in regard to property change, our moral duties in respect to it change.
Even if there were an absolute duty to obey the law always (which
is dubious), legislation in a modern state would still have to go beyond
traditional morality precisely because the latter does not offer sufficiently
definite rules to regulate the life of people that in fact have conflicting
notions of right and wrong. We see this in the conflicting claims of differ-
ent classes of society, e.g., employer and employee. The truth is that our
specific moral rules are not, as is often assumed, fixed for all time, but
vary with changing conditions; and to maintain the order necessary for
the good life, we must have the power to terminate controversies defini-
tively. This involves rules that generally are not free from all elements
of arbitrariness. Moral duties thus become more definite and clear after
the law is enacted. A consideration of the law of marriage and divorce
will make this clear. Bigamy is repugnant to the general conscience of
today. But was it adulterous for the Old Testament patriarchs to marry
more than one wife, even two sisters? Is it adulterous today to marry
two sisters successively, if death or divorce comes between the two mar-
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riages? Many who regard free love as horrible, see no objection to free
divorce. Arbitrary legislation does in fact change our judgments as to
what is moral or immoral in given situations, and the law makes crimes
of acts that were not so before the legislation took place.
THE POSITIVISTIC VIEW
The positivists who wish to develop a science of criminology, and
who believe that a science can deal only with facts of existence, find it
difficult to admit that what is a crime is- determined by legislation. They
are thus forced to maintain that certain acts are criminal by nature,
whether committed by men, beasts or even plants. Unfortunately, how-
ever, they do not tell us what traits distinguish a criminal from any other
act. What for instance makes it criminal for the sensitive plant to feed
on insects? Are not birds similarly guilty, and do not fish live by devour-
ing other fish? It seems that the positivists are here following the old
doctrine of the Stoic moralists that nature decrees certain acts as im-
permissible even to animals, so that those who violate this decree are
guilty of crimes against nature. But unless we believe in supernatural
ordinances or in a devil who interferes with our nature, we must apply
the term natural to everything that actually takes place, in the field of
legislation as well as in the field of "unnatural" or "abnormal" animal
behavior.
The most thoroughgoing attempt to define natural crime is that of
Garofalo who identifies it with those harmful actions which shock the
moral sense of pity and probity of all civilized people. This moral sense,
he holds, is not only unaffected by legislation which makes acts criminal
that were not so before, but it is independent also of the circumstances
and exigencies of any given epoch.' But how can positivists who identify
science with determinism hold that social changes can occur without hav-
ing any effect on what is deemed criminal? Garofalo admits the obvious
and well authenticated fact that laws as to what constitutes crime do
vary, but he thinks that the sentiments of pity and probity are the same
among all civilized peoples. But who are civilized people? The naive
answer is: those whose views are like our own,2 from which it follows
that our ancestors were not, and that other people with different con-
ceptions of the requisites of pity and probity are not, civilized. This use
of the term civilized seems amazingly naive but it is supported by the
fashionable assumption that there is a cosmic law according to which all
people must, regardless of diverse circumstances in their environment,
evolve along the same uniform line of which we today represent the
highest point. There is, however, no scientific evidence, logical or em-
1. GAROFALO, CRm-hNoLoGy (Tr. Millar 1914) 4.
2. Id. at 215.
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pirical, for any such law. As a matter of historic fact, not only do
different "civilized" peoples -vary in their moral sense or sentiment as
to what pity and probity require, but within any community there is a
large variation in this respect. And which view, or way of feeling, will
prevail depends on temporal changes that do not follow any one line,
but are dependent on so many circumstances or factors that the future
is unpredictable.
It is hardly necessary to show that hatred, pugnacity and brutality
have not only been human traits at all times, but have been glorified in
religion and literature. Consider the command in Deuteronomy to ex-
terminate all the inhabitants of a conquered city, or the ferocious ending
of the touching psalm "By the Rivers of Babylon," not to mention the
obvious delight in wholesale slaughter in the book of Esther, or the record
of pious, God-fearing Puritans in their treatment of Indians, or their
participation in the Negro slave traffic.3 Moreover, when we reflet on the
tortures imposed by the Inquisition, the brutalities of civil war (and even
of the economic struggle) or how certain contemporary rulers have risen
to power not only by the practice but by the very glorification of brutality,
it does not seem that the latter trait is found only among those in prison.
Civilized Italians and Germans at the time that Garofalo wrote might
have been shocked at the suggestion that their people would ever be
capable of perpetrating the cruelties which Fascists and- Nazis have exer-
cised on their opponents or even on innocent children who happened to
live in Ethiopian villages or to be of Jewish ancestry. Yet today those
responsible for these acts are national heroes and their cruelty has be-
come the virtue of fortitude and patriotic devotion to the national state.
Within American society today, there is a violent difference of feeling
or sentiment in regard to birth control. There are those who consider
it an abominable crime against nature, so that spreading information
about it or abetting it should remain a penal offense. On the other band.
there are those who feel strongly that the best interests of society demand
that such information be more widely diffused. The question as to which
party will prevail cannot be answered by any law of evolution such as
Spencer's. It depends upon such factors as legislation for improved and
more ample housing.
In the end, Garofalo admits that besides natural crime there are many
offenses which even civilized peoples do and should punish. The latter
category will be found to include most of the offenses of our criminal
law. Garofalo himself mentions not only political crimes, such as meet-
ings to conspire against the government, seditious utterances, prohibited
3. The Boers won a great deal of sympathy when they defended their c.3untry
against British imperialism but they had their own record for burning tovms, murder-
ing men and women, and stealing cattle and children. Letters of Dcrzd Lftkingslon (Aug.
1922) 130 ATLAnIc MONTHLY 212, 213.
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political demonstrations, refusal to perform required military or other
services to the state, irregularities in the conduct of elections, etc., but
also clandestine prostitution, smuggling, helping prisoners to escape, and
the like. Now if all these are not natural crimes, our prisons contain
very many who have not committed any natural crime, while many who
practice gross cruelty and improbity in business or elsewhere are not in
prison at all. There is therefore no ground for the basic assumption of
the "anthropologic" school of criminology, that the physical or mental
traits common to prisoners are distinctive of natural criminals.
Positivistic sociologists and jurists as well as moralists often identify
crime with acts which are contrary to the social interests or endanger
social existence.' But the most obvious reflection shows that this begs
the question. Acts are criminal not because they are harmful, but because
they are deemed harmful by those who make or interpret the law. The
most serious crimes are sometimes those acts that in the judgment of
enlightened and heroically unselfish people will best promote the common
good, for example, criticism of the errors of established governments
or churches. The history of the martyrs of religion and science amply
indicates that acts deemed criminal at a given time in a given community
often turn out to be of the greatest value for human life.
In the past the most heinous crimes (judging by the severity of the
punishment) havo been sacrilege or ceremonial defilement, witchcraft and
heresy. Doubtless these were regarded with terror because they were
supposed to endanger society by bringing down the wrath of gods that
are not careful to discriminate between the guilty and innocent when they
send down their lightning or plagues. But what any community regards
as most dangerous is not eternally fixed in the nature of things, but
varies from time to time and from locality to locality in ways which we
cannot always explain. Moreover, it is not always the feeling of danger
that makes us regard certain acts as punishable. The causes of social
irritation and active resentment are wider. Children in New York have
stoned men for wearing straw hats after September 15th and Mexican
peasants have burnt new orange groves planted by foreigners for no
other reason than the dislike of any novelty in their vicinity.
THaE LEGAL AND THE MORAL
The foregoing discussion has indicated not only the impossibility of
identifying the contents of the penal code with eternal morality or with
any invariant nature of things, but also the difficulty of regarding legis-
lation as purely arbitrary. Laws must often be changed if our rules of
conduct are to facilitate the good life under changing conditions. How
4. See MERCIER, CRIME AND CRIMINALS (1918).
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this is to be brought about in any given determinate social situation is
not something known in advance, but must be determined in the processes
of adjustment of our economic and political life. To be effective, the
law must have back of it the organized force of the state against those
who refuse to conform to it. This force, to be sure, can not be exercised
for any long time unless the law itself is felt by a large part of the
community to be in harmony with their prevailing customs and moral
views. But we cannot escape legal penalties by trying to show in court
that the law is unjust - for example, that the Fugitive Slave Law is
inconsistent with the natural rights of man, with the Declaration of
Independence, or with judicial dicta to the effect that our constitutional
government rests on the principles of freedom and equality. Nor can we
escape the penalties of the law of divorce or of military conscription in
a Christian country by quoting the words of Christ against divorce or
against taking up the sword to kill one's fellow man. Those who are
convinced of the existence of injustices in the established law and who
struggle for their abolition are more often defeated by general inertia
and unreasoning fear of change than by any rational counter argument.
Even a convinced and determined majority may for a considerable time
be unable to effect the legal change it desires. Hence while the criminal
law, like other branches, is largely influenced by various moral views and
sentiments, it cannot be identified with the latter- certainly not so long
as we admit the possibility of unjust laws, so often used for purposes of
oppression.
We hear a good deal of complaint about too many statutory crimes.
These complaints are rather superficial, if not entirely thoughtless. AVe
need new penal laws in cases where new conditions cannot be adequately
dealt with by reliance on customary ways. This is obviously the case
where, having introduced, e.g., the secret ballot, we need to protect its
secrecy, or having introduced telephony, we need to protect the privacy
of communications. Thus also, when modem methods of canning goods
are introduced, the community of consumers needs better protection than
the old laws or ways of doing business afford. Of course, legislative
enactments as to crime may soon become obsolescent. But that is not an
inherent evil if legislatures are as quick to repeal old laws as to enact
new ones.
It is of the utmost importance that the law be just. But it is also
important that our conception of justice and the nature of things be not
so rigid as to prevent experiments in legislation to attain optimum con-
ditions. For since we lack omniscience as to all the possible forms of
social adjustment, experimentation, or the process of learning from ex-
perience, is indispensible. Law and morality can coincide only in the
fundamental assumptions as to the proper procedure to enable us to
correct our mistakes. Their common ideal is thus like that of science,
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to wit, a system that corrects itself by the process of testing principles
by their consequences, and conversely, judging actual consequences in the
light of principles.
Judges and jurists are tempted to take the position that they have to
deal only with the existing law and need not be concerned with what the
law should be. And this is, because of the principle of strict interpreta-
tion, easier to maintain in the criminal than in any other branch of the
law. Nevertheless, in the end it is impossible for any thoughtful and
sensitive person dealing with the criminal law consistently to refrain from
passing moral judgment. And such judgment exerts a powerful influence
on the actual administration of the civil law. Yet, the legislative question
of what acts should be made criminal and which should no longer be so
treated cannot be settled by ethical principles alone. To apply the latter
we need to have factual knowledge as to what are going to be the various
consequences of the enactment or repeal to the different individuals that
will be effected thereby. As the complexity and uncertainty of future social
events generally make it next to impossible to obtain complete knowledge
on this point, and as even the acquisition of some approximate knowledge
open to our various social sciences involves enormous difficulties, moralists
have tended to ignore this factual side altogether and have asserted that
right is right regardless of all consequences. This has found expression
in the maxim fiat iustitia pereat mundus, or fiat justitia ruat coehm.
It is easy enough to dismiss this as a lazy evasion or even as inherently
absurd. It is more difficult to determine the amount of truth back of it
which has made this act appeal to so many noble spirits. We can begin
the latter task if we realize the inadequacy of the maxim that the good
or ill of any act is to be judged by its consequences only. For this does
not determine which consequences are to be deemed good and which are
to be regarded as bad. And any discriminating test which applies to con-
sequences should be applicable as well to the original act, If nothing
has any inherent or intrinsic goodness in itself, neither can the conse-
quences have it. The insistence on taking the consequences of an act
into consideration is valid only if we realize that the problem is one of
balancing immediate or present goods or ills against future ones. This
is not a solution of the problem of ethical evaluation, but it calls our
attention to our fundamental difficulty, which is that of determining the
relative weights of the different interests that are often in conflict. The
principle of the greatest good to the greatest number not only fails to
give us a common denominator or common unit for the different kinds
of value, but it is not possible to take all men and women equally into
account. The obligation to those of our own family or community, state
or nation generally seems to outweigh the interests of any equal number
of others, and it does not seem that our obligation to remotely future
generations is as great as to our more immediate ones. In the absence
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of any accurate determination of the relative weights of different obli-
gations, all sorts of variations of opinion in this respect are possible.
When we consider any course of harmful conduct, our first impulse
is to urge the enactment of a law to prohibit it; but on reflection we
become aware of the enormous cost of bringing the criminal law,- into
play. This includes not only the direct cost of policing and detection of
crime, of judicial procedure and penal institutions, but also the indirect
costs of social fear, spying, and the often unsavory effects of criminal
proceedings, as for example, in the case of adultery.
JUSTICE IN PUNISHMENT
When we raise the question of punishment, we are met at the outset
with the challenge, what right has the state to punish at all? This chal-
lenge sometimes comes from determinists who hold that the criminal
could not help doing what he did, and sometimes it comes from those
who maintain that society itself, through the conditions and institutions
which it tolerates, is ultimately the cause and therefore responsible for
the offensive acts.
Though it is customary for writers on ethics or penology to discuss
in this connection the question of determinism versus free will, that is
really not necessary for our purpose. When we are considering whether
we should or should not punish certain individuals, it is irrelevant to argue
that no one can help doing what he does. For against such an argument
it is fair to reply as the irate father did to the wayward son who used
it: "If no one can help doing what he does, then I can't help punishing
you." The truth is that the ethical question is not the metaphysical one,
whether the human will as such is or is not absolutely uncaused. but
rather how to discriminate properly between those who should and those
who should not be held accountable for legally prohibited acts. And here
the prevailing ethical conscience today seems to recognize a co mmon
sense distinction betAveen voluntary and involuntary acts and generally
holds that no one should be punished for any act in which his will did
not enter.
I shall try to show later that this principle is subject to some important
qualifications. But if we accept it, as in the main we must, we have to
answer those who claim that criminals are a special class whose acts are
not normally voluntary because they are determined by special physical,
biologic or mental conditions.
Is THERE A SPECIAL PHYSICAL CAUSE OF CRIME?
Crime and punishment were, up to the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, objects for the considerations of moralists, philanthropic reformers
and prison officials. It is to the credit of Lombroso and his associates
that they conceived that the matter should interest scientists, that since
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the criminal is a human being, reliable knowledge of the nature of crime
should be the aim of the science of anthropology.
As the most advanced science of their day was physics, they naively
assumed that the science of criminality could be established firmly by
viewing crime as a purely physical phenomenon having physical causes.
On this assumption they proceeded to measure the physical traits of
criminals in prison and found all sorts of stigmata, such as epilepsy, anaes-
thesia and the like which they attributed to degeneracy or atavism. This
movement acquired great prestige, not only because it brought in the
fashionable ideas of popular science but also because it appealed to certain
humane feelings. By insisting that the criminal is not a normal human
being who freely chooses to break the law, but is one who suffers from
certain defects, inherited or inherent in his physical constitution, they
sought to show the futile cruelty of the usual forms of punishment and
the necessity of treating the criminal with the same absence of resent-
ment that enlightened communities now treat the sick and the insane.
The great weakness of this school is its altogether inadequate con-
ception of what constitutes scientific procedure or scientific proof.
In their haste to be scientific, the members of this school did not at
the outset stop to ask precisely what was the phenomenon which they
wanted to study and explain. For obviously if crime is a violation of
the law, few of us go through life without committing some crime or
other, such as some traffic rule, or rule as to income tax returns, declara-
tion of goods bought abroad, etc. It would be a most illuminating study
to, determine why so many of us do fail to obey laws that we thoroughly
approve. We should not expect a simple answer when there are so many
different factors which make people divert from the path which they
recognize as honest or reasonable. The problems of health are relatively
simple since they depend on more verifiable physical factors. Yet who
would expect a simple answer to the question, why are not people per-
fectly healthy, or what causes disease? There are many different kinds
of diseases and of only a few do we have an adequate idea as to their
causes. How naive is it then to ask for the cause of the much more
complex phenomena of crime which are influenced not only by physical
and biologic factors but also by training, association and personal ele-
ments which are seldom if ever available for examination. In point of
fact, the positivists do not study the causes of crime in this wider sense.
What they really study are the traits of prisoners, among whom are some
who have been wrongfully convicted and have not actually violated any
law. Nor are all who have committed crimes to be found in prison, not
even all who have been apprehended and found guilty. For some have
been fined or have had sentence suspended.
Do these prisoners form a physically homogeneous group? Some
are there for purely political offenses, some for non-payment of certain
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debts, others because of embezzlement or fraudulent stock transactions,
and some for crimes of passion. Even a single category such as theft
represents most diverse types of people and motives.
Now if the analogies of biologic science are to guide us, we should
not expect the measurement of the outer physical features of all these
men and women to give us the cause of crime. At best it may reveal
some fact or element of the situation, certainly not anything like a suffi-
cient cause.
Now not only have the actual measurements been hasty and inaccurate,
but these lovers of scientific procedure fail to observe the most elementary
caution of statistical inquiry, namely, to check their generalizations by
inquiring first whether the same stigmata which they find in prison do
not exist outside of prison among people of the same situation in life.
Then, too, even if it were true that certain stigmata are more prevalent
in prison than among the same class of people outside, it does not neces-
sarily follow that these stigmata are or indicate the cause of crime. Not
all correlations have direct causal significance. The stigmata may be the
effects of the kind of life that the prisoners have lived and perhaps even
the effect of the prison itself. There are people who claim to be able
to recognize with a fair degree of accuracy criminals of a certain kind.
There is little experimental evidence for this claim, but even if it were
demonstrated, it would not follow that there are hereditary causes for
crime. All groups seem to develop noticeable characteristics so that some
can recognize sailors, clergymen, actors and other occupational groups
that are not at all hereditary and hardly attributable to any definite physi-
cal cause.
These methodologic observations do not deny that there may be physical
factors in crime, but they do warn us against accepting at its face value
the mass of "evidence" gathered by the positivistic school. On the whole,
when we consider how artificial is the distinction between the criminal
and the non-criminal, we need not be surprised to find criminologists who
assert that there is little physical difference between the two.P
There are doubtless sick and insane men and women among those
condemned for crime; and it may be that these unfortunates are more
easily seduced or led into crime than those who can take better care of
themselves. They should receive treatment in hospitals or insane asylums.
But there is no reason for ignoring distinction between crime on the one
hand and disease or insanity on the other. If the criminal be viewed as
one who has failed to adjust himself to a social environment, which of
us is properly adjusted? Certainly not the persecuted saints or prophets.
5. Loim-aRoso, L'HommE CpramINEI (1895) 324 claims that prisoners lack sensitive-
ness. This is flatly denied by Joly in La CRnme 113. See SurTnERLm, Pra.cwLEs or-
CRIMIoLOGY (1934) c. 5.
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If statistical studies show that certain crimes are more frequent in the
summer than in the winter months, it does not follow that this indicates
a direct relation between heat and criminality. There are seasonal vari-
ations of employment which may play a more direct role here. There is
also the social factor of the opportunity for certain crimes when more
people are out in the streets or in certain thoroughfares, gatherings, etc.
This may be a much closer explanation of the variations of criminality
in our northern and southern states.
ARE CRIMINALS FEEBLE-MINDED?'
In view of the difficulty of measuring the intelligence of criminals who
are not caught and put in prison, it is not easy to establish their relative
intelligence. Every knave may be a fool but there is no reason to believe
that foolishness is restricted to those who break the criminal law. It is
well to insist that those sent to prison have failed in their plans. If then
we take those who have failed in any business, might we not find them
of a lower mental average than the rest of the population? Of course,
those who fail in the business of crime are very often those who have
been exploited. Feeble-minded women especially are no match for those
captains of crime who sit behind the lines and do not suffer from the
casualties of the social war. No one can deny that the rich with a staff
of able lawyers can find their way through or around the law; and there
is no reason to suppose that the "fences" who buy up jewelry from thieves
have a lower I.Q. than the average of the communities where they live.
IS CRIME AN INSTANCE OF ATAVISM?
The theory of evolution has brought into vogue the attempt to explain
all puzzling social phenomena as survivals of the past or as instances of
reversion to the state of our remote ancestors. In line with this we have
the theory of crime as an atavistic relapse into the primitive or savage
state. But what basis is there for identifying crime with the state of
savages? Most of the savages known to us obey their customary rules
with perhaps greater regularity than we do, and there is no reason to
suppose that our remote ancestors exceeded us in the number of perjuries,
forgeries, embezzlements, fraudulent bankruptcies, counterfeiting, smug-
gling, safe-cracking and the like. Even the art of pick-pocketing can hard-
ly be regarded as a reversion to an earlier state of mankind.
To this Lombroso replies that the tendency to these crimes existed in
germ in our savage ancestors. But if, according to the theory of evo-
lution, all civilization is a maturation of the germs latent in savage socidty,
atavism can hardly be distinctive of crime. More important, however,
is it to note that while we use the word savagery as synonymous with
cruelty, it is not true that savages (e.g., those in the South Sea Islands)
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are always more cruel than civilized peoples. The popular impression to
that effect is due to the fact that we are less likely to notice those forms
of cruelty to which we have become accustomed. It is not necessary to
overlook or minimize the vices of primitive people. But it is well to note
that they became demoralized when first brought into contact with more
powerful, civilized people. This is due not only to the exploitation by
these civilized invaders, but also to the fact that demoralization naturally
follows whenever any people's habits and customs are rapidly changing.
Similar to the foregoing is the theory that crime represents that feral
strain in mankind that cannot adjust itself to the processes of civiliza-
tion. History shows that many peaceful people become criminals under
specific social conditions, e.g., the sturdy beggars in Tudor England when
people were deprived of the support they used to receive from the munas-
teries, or when their farms were turned by their lords into pasture
land. How many descendants of law-abiding families became brigands
(Klephtai) when Greece was subjugated by Turkey or when the con-
ditions of border life in America put a premium either on the life of
the ruffian or the land swindler?
CRIME AND NATURAL SELECTION
The uncritical haste to apply the theory of natural selection to the
phenomena of crime leads, as in other cases, to a confusion between
moral and biological categories. It is fortunately not necessary for our
present purpose to point out the limitations of the category of natural
selection in biology itself. That is at best a name for a large number
of factors, many of which are unknown. It is sufficient to insist that
biologic fitness to survive means a greater birth-rate than a death-rate
and that there is no reason to assume that saints multiply more rapidly
than sinners, or that moral heroes and martyrs are those who preserve
their lives longest. The distinction between the moral and the biologic
is also confused by regarding gregariousness or sociability as an un-
mitigated virtue.'
The late Professor Giddings and his disciple Hall maintained that on
the whole the process of converting immoralities into positive crimes
is one of the most powerful means by which society in the long run
6. Some years ago the benevolent anarchist Prince Kropotkin published a bak,
MruAL Am AS A FACrOR iN EvoLunox (1902), v'hich appealed to certain moralists,
though not at all to biologists. Although many instances of mutual aid among animals
were there adduced, there is no evidence that it is a factor in evolution, and no organic
developments are traced to it. Certainly, non-gregarious animals, like the tiger or the
snake, manage to survive. Indeed, the extremely individualistic uni-cellular organisms
seem to have survived for longer periods than any others. .Nor is mutual helpfulness really
an absolute moral good. The mutual aid of brigands or gangs of palitical corruptionists
makes them all the more dangerous to society; and the unquestioning subordination of
all the individuals to the state threatens today to destroy all the values of civilization.
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eliminates the socially unfit and gives an advantage in the struggle for
existence to the thoughtful, the considerate, the far-seeing and the com-
passionate, so lifting its members to higher planes of instinct and char-
acter. While such a consummation would be highly desirable, neither
Giddings nor Hall have given us any adequate evidence that that is actually
the case, certainly not enough to shake the contrary conviction that the
criminal law has often been an instrument of oppression by which the
ruling powers have managed to keep people in subjection. It is true that
in all countries at all times the most serious crime is that which endangers
not the community as a whole but the particular rulers. Thus, in Russia,
both under the czar and under the present government, ordinary murder
is punishable by a limited term in prison, but any attempt to change the
form of government is a capital offense. This does not come tinder the
exception which Giddings admits, namely the mistaken zeal which some-
times brands harmless acts as crimes. It is rather a felt necessity, on the
part of all governing classes. And when it prevents, as it often does,
any agitation for any change in government, religious views, or moral
code, it becomes a hindrance to real progress.
Theories which regard crime as a social maladjustment can recognize
that since social conditions change, an individual who is not adapted to
one set of social conditions might well be adapted to another set, so that
the cure for crime might be effected by eliminating certain social arrange-
ments rather than human beings. And those who argue that the progress
of civilization consists in raising our standards of conduct, even though
that means increasing the number of criminals, are blandly begging the
question. What is the good of such progress purchased at the cost of
preventable misery and degradation?
In general, the contention that those who manage to adjust themselves
to the existing legal system are the abler ones rests upon an ambiguity
between a tautology and an absurdity. It is a tautology, of course, that
those who are able to adjust themselves are thus able. It is an absurdity
that those who are able to adjust themselves to the existing law are
necessarily superior morally. Under different (and perhaps better) condi-
tions, the others might shine much more. Unless, therefore, we assume
that the existing law is identical with the absolute and unchanging moral
order, we cannot maintain that those who are not adjusted are necessarily
morally inferior to those who succeed. For among the former have been
political and religious martyrs, men like John Huss, Jerome of Prague
(who blessed those who burnt him), Thomas Moore and the like, while
among those who have succeeded within the law have been all sorts of
tyrants and ruthless exploiters. There are doubtless many who drift into
crime and then into prison because of moral weakness or defect. But
this does not deny that in the effort to keep out of prison, poverty is
a serious handicap. So long as the law of property makes its distribution
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unequal, it cannot be said that everyone at birth has an equal chance,
and that those who succeed in being economically comfortable are there-
fore thereby proved to be morally superior.
We come now to the argument that the cause of crime, or at least
the main cause is a result of economic conditions; and since society is
responsible for these economic conditions, society itself is responsible for
the crime. On this view it is as profoundly foolish to devote our attention
to the punishment of the criminal as to concentrate on the swatting of
mosquitoes while we allow the breeding ground to continue.
This argument raises two questions. First, are economic conditions
the sole cause of crime; and second, if so, can we dispense with punish-
ment?
THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OF CRIME
That crime has its sole cause in a given economic system is a propo-
sition which has been fanatically maintained and fanatically denied. But
if we abandon the monistic prejudice of trying to explain everything as
due to one cause, the question is not a difficult one. Crime is certainly
not unrelated to economic conditions but there is no simple ratio between
crime and poverty. There are many crimes of passion which affect the
prosperous as well as the needy. But it must be admitted that men of
wealth have a greater opportunity of escaping imprisonment. They have
more means for securing witnesses and documents, hiring more skillful
lawyers, etc.' It has been argued that a relatively small number of
prisoners have committed crimes because of actual lack of food. But
who supposes that economic need ends where the line of actual starva-
tion is passed? Moreover, it is a fact that men and women are demor-
alized by extreme poverty to the extent that they cannot bring up their
children properly. Morrison mentions in this connection that the number
of female beggars is less than the number of male ones though the
former are more often in need. But the obvious answer to this is that
successful mendicancy requires a certain energy, and that women not
only cling more to ideas of respectability but that when they go in for
mendicancy, many of them soon drift into prostitution. Aany writers
have urged that mendicancy cannot be due to extreme poverty because
there have been instances of able bodied beggars who are offered oppor-
tunities to work at fair remuneration.8 This argument seems to me to
show a singular lack of social imagination. In the first place, it ignores
the fact that none of us find it easy to change our occupation, even
though originally we may have made great efforts to avoid it. How many
of those engaged in the kind of soliciting that is regarded as respectable,
7. ETINGm, THE PRoBLEm oF CaRnE (1932) 149.
8. Molisox, C.Inm AND rrs CAUSES (1S91) 105; LEroY-BEAuLiTu, L'TAT
MODERNE (1900) 30.
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e.g., for subscriptions to periodicals or to new stock companies, would
change their occupation if offered the kind of work and pay which Monot
and the others offered? We must also remember that the granting of
alms was regarded as a virtue long before begging for it (when not
done by organized groups) became a crime.
But while there is no simple proportionality between economic distress
and criminality, the causal relation between the two cannot be ignored.
The inmates of our jails and prisons are, in overwhelming proportions,
poor people. Of course, we must take into account that the poor are
also in the great majority outside of prison. But even allowing for this,
the wealthy certainly have the advantage of attaining their ends by legal
ways which are not open to the poor. In the business world, it is common
for certain powerful financial interests to demand that they be allowed a
liberal share in certain profitable undertakings, for their ill will is very
dangerous. This was notoriously the case a few years ago in the tobacco
trade. Railroads also have been compelled to engage in certain deals
in order to give controlling bankers an opportunity to make commissions
on the flotation of certain loans. In the same way, politically powerful
individuals extort money from business men by compelling them to con-
tribute to party funds which they control. But the man without wealth or
political power has no such lever. He has to use the threat of physical
force or blackmail. This does not deny the great evil of the latter. But
though the poor are more numerous and more needy, they are not in-
herently more criminal or even more ruthless in attaining their ends.
We may conclude then that economic conditions are a very important
cause of crime. But it is obvious that not every one in a given economic
situation will be equally tempted or will as readily yield to temptation.
Psychic dispositions and previous habits and associations enter into the
situation. On the whole it can safely be asserted that the greatest resiqt-
ance to criminal temptation is steady employment. If, then, a crime
curve be plotted along the line of income, we shall not find the former
straight. We shall, I think, find the maximum in the classes that have
the lowest income, with a lower rate for peasants who continue to live
on their family lands even if on a rather low income level. There seems
to be an increase in criminality when boys and girls try to improve their
lot by going to the cities where the opportunity for crime is greater and
settled custom exerts less force. The influence, however, of past tradi-
tion may last for a considerable time. Thus, the smaller criminality
among the foreign born is to be explained not only by their age distri-
bution but by the persistence of their old home training, while the in-
creased criminality of their more Americanized children is due to the
fact that those accustomed to the old world discipline have difficulty in
transmitting it to their children who are living under new conditions.
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Does the existence of economic causes remove the necessity of punish-
ment? The fact that some conditions leading to crime are removable
does not prove that all are so. But what is even more important is to he
on guard against the assumption that the elimination of social conditions
can be effected at once. If, as human experience indicates, this is not
so easy, we may well ask of our reformers: what do you propose to
do with those guilty of rape, incendiary murder or the like? Abolish
the cause? Admirable, when feasible. But so long as these offenses do
occur, do you propose to do nothing to the offender? Even if you pro-
pose to reform him, must you not detain him against his will? And is
not such detention a punishment?
While these counter questions are legitimate, they do not gU suffi-
ciently to the root of the matter. For back of all the arguments against
the right or duty of punishment is the natural and just, if inadequately
formulated, resentment against the stupid and ineffective cruelty of our
whole penal system. It was the conservative President Taft, later Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, who characterized our criminal law a, a
disgrace to civilization.
THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR VOLUNTARY ACTS
The main principle of just criminal punishment, one that is generally
regarded as self-evident, is that one shall never be answerable for the
crime of anyone else, and for his own only to the extent that it is volun-
tary. Before the advent of the present regime in Germany, it would
have been easier to argue that these principles have been established as
the result of the long process of human evolution. But recent experience.
if not critical reflection, should make us hesitate to ignore the past ex-
perience of the human race which has by no means always accepted the
principle of no punishment except for individual voluntary action. The
whole of human history testifies to the fact that individuals are punished
for the acts of those related to them. Few readers of the Bible, I imagine,
have felt outraged at the fact that when Achan sins, his innocent children
are also killed. And today, when the head of a family is put in prison.
fined or killed, the members of his family are in fact punished, thou- h
in not quite the same way. Furthermore, as a result of the last war,
Germany was made to pay reparations, and the burden fell upon the
innocent children who bad no part and could in no way prevent the
invasion of Belgium and the destruction which it involved. Was; this
unjust? By no means, if we recognize collective responsibility. It is
obvious that in many relations the family or the nation rather than the
individual is regarded as the moral unit. This does not deny the indi-
vidual's responsibility for his own acts. But what acts are his own alone?
It is not always possible to reduce social action to that of a number of
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independent atomic units each responsible for his own deeds, since in
fact we are parts of each other's fate; and punishment or reward of any
one individual naturally affects others. Thus the members of a family
or of a nation who acquire a certain estate must necessarily participate
in the liabilities of that estate. Bills of attainder seemed quite just when
estates were given to the head of a family and were forfeited when he
proved disloyal. It is only in recent times when the economic unity of
the family is no longer so strong that such acts have been looked upon
as unjust. So long as we profit from the virtues of other members of
our family (or nation) we must be prepared to pay the penalty of their
faults.
Just as the history of religious literature impresses one with the fact
that the most dangerous sins have been involuntary ones, so does the
history of the criminal law reveal the fact that unintentional acts have
been and to some extent still are punished. Even in Biblical law the man
who unintentionally caused the death of another was subject to the same
penalties as if he had done it intentionally. The Deuteronomic reform
consisted in providing a city of refuge for the one who was the innocent
cause of death; but he could be killed with impunity if caught outside
of its gate. In general the conditions of modern life and the emphasis
on the subjective elements in our thought, have stressed the voluntary
phase of conduct in the criminal law as elsewhere. We no longer punish
animals or inanimate objects for injuries that result from them. The
law no longer holds me responsible when I am deprived of the usual
freedom of action by purely external physical forces, e.g., when I am
pushed or thrown. Similarly, I am not a free agent in the legal sense
if purely physiologic factors prevent normally conscious action, e.g., if
I faint and fall or if my arm gets paralyzed and I cannot do the things
that the law requires me to do. In more recent times the law is beginning
to give more recognition to psychic hindrances to normally voluntary
action. It is now considered useless cruelty to punish those who are so
insane that they do not know what they are doing, or cannot distinguish
between right and wrong. The deterrent value of such punishment would
be almost nil. I say almost, for it may be argued that the deterrent effect
of punishment depends upon the certainty of its being applied and that
this is somewhat diminished when there is the ability to hire experts to
convince a jury that the one who committed a criminal act was not sane
at the time he did it.
Whether because psychiatry is not yet an exact science, or whether
because there are so many intermediate cases between the completely (if
only momentarily) insane and those who are perfectly in control of their
thoughts and acts (if indeed there be any such), any sharp line of divi-
sion between the legally responsible and those not so responsible is neces-
sarily somewhat arbitrary. The whole criminal law would certainly break
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down if any one could escape the legal penalty because of ignorance or
confusion as to what is right and what is wrong. If yielding to the desire
to take attractive articles without pay should cease to be theft when called
kleptomania, then the law against stealing might as well be abolished.
Alienists and others who have not been trained to rigorous critical stand-
ards of scientific evidence or proof are apt to be misled by highly developed
technical terminologies into overestimating the amount of determinate
and verifiable knowledge at their disposal. This shows itself in the readi-
ness with which different experts testify on opposite sides of a case. Under
the circumstances it is natural for judges, who see too many criminals
escape the just penalties of the law, to look with distrust at any extension
of this opportunity under the guise of science. Possibly some judges are
unduly conservative. But it is not for our purpose necessary to decide
the exact extent to which psychiatry can at present tell us whether a man
has acted under such an abnormal compulsion as not to know what he
was doing or not to be able to distinguish between right and wrong. It
is sufficient for us to realize that relatively few of us are so free from
all inner compulsions as to realize perfectly what we are doing, or to
know adequately the difference between right and wrong. The prevalence
of human error, regret and disappointment seem to indicate that most of
us are in the intermediate zone, and if there is to be any legal responsi-
bility at all, it must include many doubtful cases.
There are also various reasons why certain people may by rule be
exempted from the normal workings of the criminal law. It is not feasible
to give ordinary officials the right to arrest or prosecute the ambassador
of a foreign country, or the king or other head of our own state. If
these do commit forbidden acts, our remedy must be sought elsewhere
than in the ordinary criminal law. Children below a certain age cannot
be tried at all because of the presumption that they do not know what
they are doing. But like all conclusive presumptions, this one contains
an element of fiction. The act of a child between six and seven, for
instance, may actually be more intelligently and consciously planned than
the acts of many a low-witted adult. But on the whole, the amount of
injury done by children under seven that could possibly be minimized by
prosecuting them (and going through the difficult task of determining
whether they knew what they were doing) does not warrant doing
violence to the general sense of the sacredness of childhood. And so we
draw an arbitrary line at the age of seven or so.
THE RETRIBUTIVE, EXPIATORY OR RETALIATORY THEORY
Against the doubt as to whether the state has any right to punish at
all, this theory maintains it to be a positive moral duty. It regards crime
as a violation or disturbance of the divine or moral order. W\Then Cain
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kills Abel, the very earth cries for vengeance. The moral order can be
restored, or the violation atoned for only by inflicting evil (generally
pain) upon the one guilty.
It is easy, far too easy, to dismiss this theory with the remark that
it is a remnant of the barbaric conception of vengeance as an absolute
duty. The sentiment of just vengeance or retribution is too deeply
grounded in human nature, and embodied in too many moral and re-
ligious codes, to be thus lightly dismissed. It is profoundly foolish to
suppose that anyone can by the free use of ugly epithets eradicate the
desire to return a blow or to give active expression to the resentment
against injury. It is not only barbaric people who regard punishment
as a duty. As I pointed out before, the highly idealistic or spiritual book
of Deuteronomy deemed that one had a right to avenge the killing of
a kinsman even when the killing was accidental. And the stern Greek
moralist, Aeschylus, would not deny altogether the duty of a son to
avenge the murder of his father even against his mother. The tradi-
tional code of honor still prevailing in Europe is that a gentleman must,
at the risk of his life, resent an insult to the extent of seeking to remove
it with the blood of the offender. In the clubs of European gentlemen,
the English and Americans used to be looked down upon, because they
would not fight duels. But even with us, popular sentiment was expressed
by Theodore Roosevelt who regarded a man as a poltroon who, when
his wife was insulted, called on a policeman instead of exercising a gentle-
man's duty to knock the offender down. And this view seems to prevail
among those nations that are generally regarded as most enlightened. To
defend the national honor one must fight or make reprisals for insults,
In religion, this sentiment expresses itself in the orthodox theory that
heaven would be less fair or that God's justice would be tarnished if
there were no hell for the sinners, even when the sins are not the result
of free will. Kant, who went to extremes in putting duty for duty's sake
foremost, expressed an undoubtedly wide sentiment when he urged that
we could not regard a world as moral if in it virtue went unrewarded
or sin unpunished.
But does this retributive theory offer us a criterion whereby to dis-
criminate between just and unjust punishment? Kant offers us the jus
talionis, the principle of equality between the crime and the penalty. This
sounds simple in the case of murder, a life for a life. But it is obviously
not capable of being extended. Crime and punishment are different things.
Can they really be equated? What penalty equals the crime of forgery,
perjury or kidnapping? For the state to exercise the same amount of
fraud or brutality on the criminal that the criminal exercised on his
victim would be demoralizing to any community. In point of fact, not
even the rigoristic Kant has the courage of his hard convictions; and
he refuses to prescribe the death penalty in such cases as dueling and
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infanticide or to all those engaged in a rebellion. Indeed, he hesitates
at prescribing a death penalty in cases where such penalty will not act
as a deterrent. Moreover, if we accept the jis talionis as absolute, we
make it immoral to pardon a criminal. Yet, the moral and religious
conscience of mankind has always regarded charity or mercy as of su-
preme value and forgiveness has been preached as a divine virtue.
But if the old form of the hIa" talionis, an eye for an eye or a tooth
for a tooth, sounds too barbaric today, may we not reformulate the
retributive theory and put it thus: everyone is to he punished alike in
proportion to the gravity of his offense or to the extent to which lie has
made others suffer? As Iittermeier, the leading criminalist of the early
nineteenth century once put it, "The penalty which transgresses by even
one atom the seriousness of the crime is unjust." But by what yardstick
or measure can we determine the precise degree of offensiveness, or the
exact amount of suffering that the criminal has imposed on the victim
or on all those who depend on the latter? And how can we measure the
severity of the punishment? Historically the plea for equality has meant
a reaction or revulsion against the ignoring of it in previous criminal
laws: let us have no more favorites, no more tariff of offenses with
different rates according to the social standing of the offenders as in
Anglo-Saxon England or in the France of the ancient regime. But what
is the same punishment? Is the same fine, for example, productive of
the same effect on rich and poor? Or does the same number of years
in prison have the same effect on different individuals regardless of their
diverse temperaments or physique? If we took the principle of equality
literally as absolute, we should not have any right to make any distinc-
tion in the punishment of a first offender and a hardened criminal, be-
tween a man acting under natural passion, for example an outraged
father or husband, and a shrewdly calculating villain.
Despite the foregoing and other limitations of the retributive theory,
it contains an element of truth which only sentimental foolishness can
ignore. The sentiment that injuries should be avenged still prevails in
the relations between nations and cannot be ignored within the life of
any community. The problem of enlightened social morality is not to
suppress the natural desires of human beings. Such suppression may
itself be vain or cruel. Morality should aim to eliminate or minimize
the brutality of natural vengeance or such results as would breed more
general evil than the suffering of any particular injury.
If the natural desire for vengeance is not met and satisfied by the
orderly procedure of the criminal law we shall revert to the more bloody
private vengeance of the feud and of the vendetta. We must remember
that lynch law is not a recent American invention but rather the primitive
form of public justice, and that the formal procedure of the criminal law
is only a more rational expression of this primitive demand. The criminal
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law deals not with a kingdom of heaven but with actual men and women
of flesh and blood living on earth.
While the principle of equality cannot be literally carried out it does
suggest that no system of punishments will be considered just if it shows
evidence of what is generally considered favoritism.
THE REFORm THEORY
The most popular theory today is that the proper aim of criminal pro-
cedure is to reform the criminal so that he may become adjusted to the
social order. A mixture of sentimental and utilitarian motives gives this
view its great vogue. With the spread of humane feeling and the waning
of faith in the old conception of the necessity for inflicting pain in the
treatment of children and those suffering from mental disease, there has
come a revulsion at the hard-heartedness of the old retributive theory.
The growing belief in education and in the healing powers of medicine
encourages people to suppose that the delinquent may be re-educated to
become a useful member of society. Even from the strictest economic
point of view, individual men and women are the most valuable assets
of any society. Is it not better to save them for a life of usefulness
rather than punish them by imprisonment which generally makes them
worse after they leave than before they entered?
There are, however, a number of highly questionable assumptions
back of this theory which need to be critically examined.
We have already had occasion to question the assumption that crime
is a physical or mental disease. We may now raise the question whether
it is curable and if so at what cost to society? Benevolent social reformers
are apt to ignore the amount of cold calculating business shrewdness
among criminals. Some hot-blooded ones may respond to emotional
appeal; but they are also likely to backslide when opportunity or tempta-
tion comes along. Human beings are not putty that can be remolded at
will by benevolent intentions. The overwhelming majority of our crim-
inals have been exposed to the influence of our school system which we
have at great cost tried to make as efficient as possible. Most criminals
are also religious, as prison chaplains can testify. Yet with all our efforts
school education and religion do not eliminate crime. It has not even been
demonstrated that they are progressively minimizing it. Nor does the
record of our special reformatories for young offenders prove that it is
always possible to reform even young people so that they will stay re-
formed for any length of time. The analogy of the criminal law to
medicine breaks down. The surgeon can determine with a fair degree
of accuracy when there is an inflamed appendix or cancerous growth, so
that by cutting it out he can remove a definite cause of distress. Is there
in the complex of our social system any one cause of crime which any
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social physician can as readily remove on the basis of similarly verifiable
knowledge?
Let us abandon the light-hearted pretention that any of us know how
all cases of criminality can be readily cured, and ask the more modest
and serious question: to what extent can criminals be re-educated or
re-conditioned so that they can live useful lives? It would indeed be
illiberal dogmatism to deny all possibility and desirability of effort along
this line. Yet we must keep in mind our human limitations.
If the causes of crime are determined by the life of certain groups,
it is foolish to deal with the individual as if he were a self-sufficient and
self-determining system. We must deal with the whole group to which
he naturally belongs or gravitates and which determines his morale.
Otherwise we have to adapt him completely to some other group or social
condition, which is indeed a very difficult problem in social engineering.
And here we must not neglect the question of cost. When we refer
to any measure as impracticable, we generally mean that the cost is too
great. There is doubtless a tremendous expense in maintaining our
present system of punishment. But this expense is not unlimited. Sup-
pose that fiendish perpetrators of horrible crimes on children could be
reformed by being sent first for several years to a special hospital. Will
people vote large funds for such purposes when honest law-abiding citizens
so often cannot get adequate hospital facilities? Suppose that we find
that a certain social environment or that an elaborate college course will
reform a burglar or gunman, would our community stand for the expense
when so many worthy young people cannot afford to go to college be-
cause they have to go to work? We certainly should not give even the
appearance of reward for criminality. Let us not forget that there is
always a natural resentment in any society against those who have at-
tacked it. Will people be satisfied to see one who is guilty of horrible
crimes simply reformed, and not give vent to the social horror and
resentment against the miscreant? It is difficult to believe that any such
course would not result in a return to personal vengeance on the part
of the relatives or friends of the victim.
A crucial instance of the inadequacy of the reform theory is the case
of a man who we are fairly certain will not commit the given offense
again. A burgler, for instance, in trying to enter a house breaks his leg
so that he can never again engage in that enterprise. A man in despera-
tion kills one who has ruined his family life and it becomes obvious
that he will never again have a chance to be in a similar situation. Or
take the case of one who can for any reason convince us that the criminal
act itself has sobered him so that never again will he commit such an
act. What more can reform achieve in these cases? Shall we then close
the account and let the guilty one off? That would arouse not only
general resentment but would open the gates to all sorts of abuses and
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would certainly so encourage crime that the suffering of innocent people
would increase.
It has been argued that on the theory of protection to society there
should be no punishment for one who is no longer capable of doing harm.
But this ignores the fact that the law contemplates not only the indi-
vidual at the bar but all others who might be tempted to commit similar
offenses even under conditions not quite the same.
PUNISHMENT AS A MEANS OF PREVENTING CRIME
If we look at the criminal as one who assails or endangers the proper
life of the community, it is not only our right but our duty to defend,
if not ourselves, at least our dependents. Primitive communities effect
this by getting rid of the unruly member through death or outlawry.
In the course of time, this is largely replaced by fine or imprisonment.
Societies, however, never abandon the effort to minimize crime by pun-
ishing the offenders. We do this by incapacitating the criminal either
through death or detention, and by deterring him and others through
the example of the painful consequences of crime to the criminal.
Few have ever argued against the right of society to protect itself
and prevent crime by detaining the criminal at least so long as there is
some reason to suppose that it would be dangerous to set him free. But
the right to punish anyone to deter him or others from future acts, has
been widely challenged on grounds of (1) justice and (2) utility.
1. Kant and others have urged that it cannot be just to punish any-
one except for a wrong actually committed; and much less can it be just
to punish Peter in order to prevent Paul from attempting any crime.
This is an appeal to a principle so seemingly self-evident that most writers'
on the criminal law have preferred to ignore the objection rather than
to meet it. But modern science has made enormous progress by learning
to distrust self-evident principles. We need not, therefore, hesitate to
challenge Kant's assumption in this case. Why should we not inflict
pain on A if that is the only way of securing the safety of the society
of which he is a part, or preserving the general conditions of deirable
life on which he depends for all his goods? We tax an old bachelor for
the support of the education of other men's children and we conscript
our youth and put them in positions where they will be killed in order
that others shall be able to live. Consider the case of the typhoid carrier
Mary who spreads the germs of that dreadful disease wherever she goes.
Do we not by detaining her and limiting her freedom in effect punish
her for her misfortune rather than for her fault? We are at all times
inflicting pains on innocent people in order to promote the common good,
in time of peace, as well as in war. When we need a road or bridge,
do we not order a family to abandon the house which has been its home
[Vol. 49 : 9871014
THE CRIMINAL LAW
from time immemorial, and for which there can be no equivalent resti-
tution or compensation? The fact is, that the lives of individuals are
not independent atoms which can be treated in isolation. We are all
members of a common body and the health of the entire body may de-
mand inflicting pain or even the cutting off of some member.
This does not mean the complete abandonment of the principle that
one should be responsible only for his own voluntary act. That would
be opening the floodgates to the most extreme and outrageous injustice.
But our principle may be viewed not as an isolated independent absolute,
but as the statement of a general condition of the social order necessary
for the good life. Certainly nothing would be so detrimental to the
effective enforcement of the law than the feeling in any community that
some may commit crimes and others will be punished.
This approach comes closer to the actual conscience of humanity and
cuts the ground from the Kantian objection. A state has as much right
to reform a criminal, even against his will, as to educate a child or to
compel one with a contagious disease to be quarantined or to undergo
curative treatment. And while it would destroy the basis of all that we
hold dear in civilized life to make one man suffer merely that another
be advantaged thereby, no society under present conditions can achieve
the good of the whole without causing more suffering to some than to
others. One need only add that we cannot be too critical in determining
whether the good of the whole is promoted when the innocent suffer.
For if we realize that our means are always part of the total end, we
can see reason to doubt the goodness of an end which involves evil
means. Unfortunately, however, the actual choice that life presents to
any society is seldom a clear issue between absolute good and absolute
evil but generally a choice between alternatives, all of which are imperfect
embodiments of justice or of the highest good. Wisdom consists in such
a balancing of rival considerations, that the total amount of evil is
minimized.
2. We come now to the much more common objection that punish-
ment does not in fact deter either the one punished, or others. Criminals
who are tempted will not, we are told, desist from taking a risk just as
wolves who attack a wild horse on the Russian steppes will not abandon
their effort after one or two of them are killed or crushed by the horse's
hoof. There are more dangerous occupations than crime; yet people are
not deterred from taking the risk.
Those who urge this objection illustrate the abuse of absolutism in
the discussion of practical issues. To prove the utility of medicine it is
not necessary to prove that it always prevents death and cures all in-
stances of disease. It is enough if life is often prolonged and suffering
sometimes diminished by its wise use. And to justify punishment it is
not necessary to prove that it always prevents crime by its deterrent
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quality. It is enough to indicate that there would be more crime if all
punishment were abolished. Now we may ignore the positivistic dogma
that punishment cannot possibly have any deterrent effect, that criminals
are bound to commit crimes. That kind of fatalism is not only opposed
by human experience but it is not even consistent with scientific deter-
minism which it professes to follow. All experiments on animals as well
as the historic observations of human experience indicate that fear of
painful consequences is as effective a force in life as is the prospect of
pleasant rewards. We are living at a time when terror on a large scale
has succeeded in removing the effective temptation to rebellion. When
in 1920 the police of Boston struck and left their posts, a lot of young
men broke store windows and possessed themselves of goods which they
tried to sell at prices which no trained or professional criminal would
demand. Sir James F. Stephen has suggested the following query. Sup-
pose a burglar feels that he might catch a cold that would incapacitate
him for as long a period as the usual prison term for burglary. Would
that not deter him? Of course that largely depends on the exercise of
the imagination. And the law, if wisely administered, should dramatize
its punishment. It is the fact that all men live more or less in their
imagination and any imaginative realization that one will be hissed off
the social stage or suffer pain is bound to act as a strong deterrent. In
this connection, it is well to repeat the frequently-made, but still just
observation that not only the severity but the certainty of punishment
is a factor in the case. Men will risk their lives if they think that there
is some chance of winning something. And while many will take very
"long" chances, as in lotteries, it is a fact that professional crime, like
any other business, ceases to grow in extent when the chances of failure
rise. That is why bandits do not try to rob the United States Treasury,
or the Mint.
In general we know that just as certain factors will tend to increase
crime, so certain factors will tend to diminish the amount of it; and
that the penalties of the law, if enforced, constitute one of these mini-
mizing causes. There is no doubt that the abolition of the police force,
or the lessening of their vigilance or competence to detect the crime and
to apprehend the criminal will tend to increase the amount of crime.
Thus not only the specific penalty but the question of the procedure or
mechanism of its enforcement, the ease of its proof, and the likelihood
of finding proper witnesses are all determinants.
It is true that men follow the mores apart from any fear of punish-
ment, because normally that seems the only way in which one can act.
But in a heterogeneous society, where diverse moral standards prevail
and where conditions are rapidly changing, the temptation to depart from
the hitherto accepted ways rises rapidly; and the fear of social disap-
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proval decreases even more rapidly when we associate only with those
who have the same inclinations that we have.
PUNISHMENT AS REPROBATION
We may look upon punishment as a form of communal expression.
An organized group, like an individual, needs to give vent to its feel-
ing of horror, revulsion or disapproval. We turn away in disgust at
certain uncleanly or unaesthetic traits of an individual and exclude him
from our company without inquiring as to whether it is within his power
to prevent being repulsive. It is only personal love like that of a mother
that can train itself to overlook repellent features or devote time and
energy to eliminate them. It is one of the functions of the criminal la,
to give expression to the collective feeling of revulsion toward certain
acts, even when they are not very dangerous - for example, buggery.
There are, of course, various forms and degrees of social disapproval
and it is not always necessary to bring the legal machinery into opera-
tion. But at some point or other the collective feeling must be embodied
in some objective communal act. By and large such expression of dis-
approval is a deterrent. But, deterrence here is secondary. Expression
is primary. Such disapproval need not be cruel or take extreme forms.
An enlightened society will recognize the futility of severely punishing
unavoidable retrogression in human dignity. But it is vain to preach
to any society that it must suppress its feelings. In all our various social
relations, in business, in public life, in our academic institutions and
even in a church, people are rewarded for being attractive and therefore
penalized for not being so.
The reprobative theory will explain why it is difficult to repeal penal
statutes where no one believes that the punishment will have any re-
formatory effect on the offender or any deterrent effect on others and
consequent diminution of the number of offenses. An example of this
is the law against suicide. There are also statutes such as those making
adultery a crime which the community does not want to see enforced.
For the publicity in the matter would do more harm than good. Yet
people will not vote to repeal it; for such repeal would look like remov-
ing the social disapproval.
THE CRUELTY OF PUNISHMENT
The foregoing discussion of punishment may have impressed the
reader as too hard-hearted. It seems to lack indignation at the demor-
alizing effect of cruelty. If punishment means inflicting.pain. how can
we avoid cruelty? It is no answer to say that the physician also inflicts
pain, and is justified by the fact that he removes a greater amount of
pain. For who can say that prison life saves the convict from more
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pain than it inflicts on him? Few prisoners will answer in the affirma-
tive, for very few want to remain longer than they possibly can help.
But people do go voluntarily to the doctor. No, the justification of pun-
ishment is not saving pain to the criminal but to the great mass of people
who have to be protected from criminal acts.
And here it is well to note that it is impossible to live at all without in-
flicting pain on others as well as on one's self and on those we love. On the
biological level, it is impossible to live at all without killing other creatures
(plants or animals), either for purposes of food or for protection (wild
beasts, vermin, etc.). In the human field we may wish to minimize the
struggle for existence. But so long as different peoples want the same
land (and only those who are especially prosperous are satisfied with
their own possessions), and are not ready to give up what others more
urgently need, there is bound to be war. And so long as two different
parties want to control the government (which is likely to be the case
so long as two men want the same office), there is bound to be political
conflict and human suffering. It is a mistake to assume that human
history shows a gradual but constant elimination of such suffering. It
shows only a shift or change in the forms of it. It may perhaps be
said that progress consists in the refinement of suffering. But such re-
finement is largely aesthetic and by no means eliminates cruelty. Under
the circumstances, it is folly to preach love of all mankind, for mankind
includes all the horrible villains whose atrocious villainies grow out of
their human nature. Indeed, there is nothing vile in human affairs that
can genuinely be said to be foreign to human nature. All the sweetness
and grace which makes life in its happy moments so delectable has its
seamy side which cannot be hidden to an all-seeing eye. The effort to
make life more decent therefore always involves a struggle against op-
posing forces. And in this struggle men find hatred as well as love,
tonic emotions. Indeed, we must hate evil if we really love the good.
(Undiscriminating love extended to everyone is nonsense.) We must
hate evil intensely if we are to fight it successfully, and we cannot hate
theft, violence and fraud except when we see it embodied. It is thus
impossible not to be indignant against certain criminals, or not to wish
to punish them.
If civilization, however, means rationality in the elimination of needless
cruelty, then our methods of punishment must certainly undergo profound
changes even though they cannot cease to be punishments. Thus it is
progress if we stop branding criminals, even though we keep their records;
and it would be retrogression if we went back to the whipping post, the
stocks, the practice of breaking men's bones on the wheel and the other
old forms of torture. While the sterilization of certain kinds of criminals
may be indicated, it may also open the gates for unlimited cruelty, as seems
to be the case in Germany today.
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The punishment provided by the criminal law is a sad necessity. But
even if it is bitter medicine, there is no wisdom in unlimited doses of it.
It is well to realize that the mere conviction of a crime brings social
dishonor, and that may in some, though not in all cases, be sufficient.
Thus, impeachment and removal from office does not necessarily demand
subsequent imprisonment. But above all it is needlessly cruel to add to
human temptation, or to make it more difficult for unfortunates to over-
come the temptation, and then to punish them for it. Of course, every
progress in civilization may add to the difficulties of adapting ourselves
to the new social standards; and it may be argued that it is of the very
essence of civilization that we should increase the temptation and with
it the power of self-control. That might be claimed as the superiority
of the West over the East in regard to sex relations. But after all civiliza-
tion may be purchased at too great a price. Of what value is a civiliza-
tion if it leads to physical and moral misery? May not one reverse the
argument and say that only those social arrangements represent true
progress which make life more serene and less tortured? So judged,
many of the improvements of civilization might well be condemned. And
the criminal law would offer a great deal of evidence along this line.
THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT
Dominated by the reaction against the abstractness of the classical
emphasis on equality and influenced by the prevailing tendency to think
of crime as a disease, the idea has recently spread that in punishment
we should pay more attention to the individual criminal rather than to
the abstract crime. Just as medicine is turning from specific remedies,
the same for everybody, to greater emphasis on individual diagnosis and
treatment, so penologists are urging that since no given punishment has
the same effect on different individuals, it would be more humane as well
as realistic to make the punishment fit the criminal rather than the crime.
While this theory has elements of novelty in its formulation" and ap-
plication, it is not altogether new in principle. Theoretically, it is but a
re-assertion of the old idea of equity (epieikia) as the correction of the
undue rigor of the law, a corrective to the injustice which results from
the fact that the abstract rule cannot take into account all the specific
circumstances that are relevant to the case. It assumes its simplest and
oldest form in the pardoning power. Strictly speaking, the pardoning
power is inconsistent with the view that punishment is an absolute duty
prescribed by the moral law for all those found guilty by the proper
tribunal. And the humane feeling or good sense of mankind has never
in fact yielded to the Stoics, Kantians and others who had the courage
9. It is sometimes formulated in an extremely nominalistic form, as if the individual
could be treated apart from his universal determinants.
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of their one-sided dogmas. Some religions, indeed, make God's forgive-
ness His most glorious attribute.
Let us look at the matter a little more closely. Let us distinguish the
pardoning power from the corrective justice exercised by a court when it
frees a man because of a flaw in the evidence or procedure by which he
has been condemned. When the technicalities of legal administration pre-
vent courts from correcting such legal errors, the Chief Executive exer-
cises the same judicial power when, after a hearing, he pardons the person
convicted.
There are cases of undoubted technical guilt, where the results of the
strict application of abstract law are felt to be shocking to our moral
sense. The abstract law cannot take difficulties and temptations into
account, but a humane administration of it must if it is to keep the
respect of the people. Theft is always a crime but few of us would be
shocked at the pardoning of a mother who stole food to prevent her
children from starving. Nor would we feel that justice suffered if an
escaped convict, like Jean Valjean, were pardoned after he had for so
long shown the qualities of a good citizen as mayor of his town, On the
contrary, we think the administration of justice inept if he is returned
to the galleys. The pardoning power is also generally regarded as neces-
sary or desirable in mass phenomena, as in the case of a general pardon
for rebels, rioters, or whole classes of prisoners. It is generally issued
in the form of a favor but it is actuated by a desire to promote good
will to the government by placating discontented elements or diminishing
the current amount of resentment. In the main, amnesty is like making
peace with an army with which one has fought. If we have to live with
people, it is well to have their good will. But if we allow such acts of
wholesale pardon, we have abandoned absolute theories of punishment.
This is not the place for a thorough expos6 of the unsatisfactory char-
acter of "rigoristic" theories of morality which leave no room for the
pardoning power. The superficial character of the sharp line between
legal morality and social utility which these theories draw, is seen in their
attitude to statutes of limitation. According to the theory that rights
and wrongs remain eternally what they are, the mere lapse of years can
make no relevant difference to anyone's claims. But if we look carefully
at the practical conditions of human conduct we cannot thus ignore the
element of time. It would upset all human calculations and expectations
and thus make our transaction most uncertain if claims no matter how
ancient and long-forgotten could suddenly be revived. Why may not then
a man be freed from punishment, if the accusation or indictment has not
been brought or pressed against him for a sufficiently long period? While
statutes of limitations are not technically exercises of the pardoning
power, they do illustrate the fact that people generally feel that a lapse
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of time justifies the abandonment of a punislunent, just as a father is
disinclined to punish a child for last year's fault.
When all this is said, it remains true that the pardoning power can
be, and has been, a prolific source of injustice. We need not refer to the
Texas governor who pardoned hundreds of criminals for his political
advantage. There are other and subtler forms of injustice in the exer-
cise of the pardoning power. A young man of good family is convicted.
Then all sorts of good people intervene with testimonials which a less
advantageously situated individual cannot get. Wqen the rich or those
who have political influence can thus "get away with murder," the general
expectation of justice through law tends to disintegrate.
The power to pardon, which naturally includes the power to commute
or reduce the terms of the court's sentence, is generally entrusted to the
head of the state, who sometimes delegates it to an official such as the
British Home Secretary. But if the mitigation of the rigor of the la,.-
is to be done intelligently and justly on the basis of thorough knowledge,
should it not also be given to the judge who has heard all the evidence in
the case and has had the guilty one before him? The recognition of this
has led in recent years to increase the discretionary power of the judge
in imposing sentence. Instead of fixing the penalties for diverse crimes,
legislatures now tend to fix upper and lower limits between which the
judge can determine by himself the proper sentence. He may even sus-
pend sentence altogether in some cases, or put the guilt), one on probation.
Any sentence, however, that the judge imposes, involves more or less
a guess as to its effect on the character of the convict. But a board of
prison officials who have had an opportunity to study the actual conduct
of the prisoner ought to be in a better position as to when he is ready
to leave prison fit to reenter the "free" world and engage in its lawful
activities. On this theory are based the various forms of our parole
system.
Any plausible attempt to reform something that has worked as hor-
ribly as our prison system should have its frailties viewed with benevolent
patience. Given time and experience, the new movement may overcome
many of the evils which it has already manifested, such as the abuse of
discretion by judges and parole boards, and the number of paroled pris-
oners who commit new crimes. But it is always helpful to clarify the
issue by critically examining fundamental ideas.
1. The advocates of individualization of punishment should beware
of overworking the analogy between crime and disease. Crime is not
the direct result of physiologic factors but depends directly on social
institutions. It is foolish to talk glibly of treating the criminal according
to his individual nature when in fact we have no means of adequately
knowing it. The physician does not need to know all about a man's
individual character. In his diagnosis he looks for very definite facts of
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a recurrent character and once that is determined, the treatment moves
along a limited number of alternatives. But can any judge be honestly
said to know the character of a person convicted sufficiently to determine
what precise treatment is needed? Similarly with parole boards. A man's
conduct in prison is not always the best indication of what he will do
when released. And in point of fact prison officials can be and have been
influenced by political and social pressure.
2. The ideology of individualization tends to an extremely nominal-
istic position. That is, it tends to forget the logical fact that we are apt
to have more reliable knowledge about classes than about individuals and
that for certain purposes classes rather than individuals are relevant, If
our country is invaded, we try to take measures against the invading army
or armies. The treatment of individual soldiers is determined by these
general policies. Of course, we may avoid the false ideology criticized
here by admitting all this and saying that the law needs more individ-
ualization of treatment than exists at present. But it is of the utmost
importance not to forget that the abuse of discretion was one of the
principle causes which led to the revolt expressed in the classical views
on penology -a revolt that has undoubtedly done much for the human-
ization of the criminal law and its administration. And it would be a great
calamity if this gain were frittered away by hastily conceived novelties.
THE KINDS OF PUNISHMENT
When we think of the great diversity of crimes, the paucity of our
means of punishment is amazing. Death, imprisonment and money fine
pretty nearly exhaust the field, just as the calomel pill and the lancet (for
blood letting) exhausted the remedies of the old fashioned medical prac-
tice. Of course, any conviction brings social disgrace, which is a very
severe punishment in some cases. Removal and disqualification for further
public office is also an unusual and rather rare phenomenon. Recently we
have introduced sterilization (in some of our states and in Germany)
and it seems the only appropriate remedy for certain kinds of dreadful
crimes. But the brutalizing effect on a community of thus disfiguring
a human being is not to be lightly ignored. All proposals for whipping
posts, and similar arrangements, should recall to us the struggle to get
rid of the cruelty of the old forms of torture in the criminal law. It
may be, as Dean Inge has suggested, that we have become too sensitive
to pain, and that the decline of true aesthetic sensibility is associated with
this hyperaesthesia. But if so, so much the worse for aesthetics.
The Death Penalty. Up to modern times the law seems to have had
a remarkable preference for the death penalty. If a man gathers wood
on the Sabbath, he should be stoned to death. If he says something
insulting to his father or mother, he should be put to death. English law
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well into the nineteenth century made theft of anything over three shil-
lings, six pence, a capital offense, and there was a long list of many other
acts, now minor offenses, that were punishable with death. To be sure,
on many occasions these penalties were not enforced in later times, but
the idea that such penalties are necessary was certainly widely accepted.
According to the Kantian philosophy, the death penalty for a murderer
is not simply permissible but is an absolute duty, and Kant wrote after
Beccaria had maintained that the death penalty was absolutely wrong,
incompatible with the basic social contract. The controversy as to the
right of the state to kill a citizen for any cause whatsoever has continued
ever since with considerable sentimental heat but not much illumination.
Nor does it seem that the different parties can arrive at any agreement
if they start with different attitudes to the value of physical life. No
one doubts that there is something horrible about killing a man or woman,
and that the state should maintain the supreme value and sanctity of
human life. Yet no one has consistently carried out the view that under
no circumstance may a life be destroyed. Few deny the right of killing
a bandit who attacks us or those dependent on us, and most people not
only approve but glorify the killing on a wholesale scale of those with
whom we are at war. Ve allow automobiles to kill over 36,000 people
every year which we well could prevent by foregoing the convenience
it offers. (The argument that the automobiles saves as many lives as
it destroys or maims cannot be supported by reliable evidence). We also
allow people to be killed by mine or factory accidents or through under-
nourishment, when we could prevent it by definite though expensive social
measures. These examples suggest that our revulsion against murder is
rather against direct and messy forms of it. Balzac has expressed that
through the query: if you could inherit a great fortune by killing a
Mandarin in China by just blinking your eye when no one could see
you do it, would you do it? In any case, we do shorten human lives by
economic conditions which compel men to undertake such work as house-
wrecking where the mortality is often as high as twenty per cent per
annum.
While these considerations throw doubt on the claim that the taking
of life is absolutely prohibited by the moral code of all mankind, they
do not support the present or any other legal system. It may be that in
some cases the death penalty should be eliminated but perhaps extended
in other cases. Certainly we should minimize the public brutality involved
in hanging or even in the burning which we call electrocution.
Fines. Fines, like money damages in the civil law, are frequent penalties
in the criminal law and used to be even more common. Indeed, in former
times the monetary value of human life was fixed by a definite tariff. This
does not necessarily mean that human life was held cheap (though that
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may have been a factor), but that money was so dear that men sold
themselves into practical slavery to acquire it. If a family lost a member
through murder, it had a right to vengeance. But the loss might be made
good by the tribe of the murderer giving up one individual who would
either be killed to satisfy the desire for vengeance or made a slave to
repair the loss. An additional laborer is under certain conditions as valu-
able as an additional ox, horse or the money that will buy other means
of subsistence. Hence the seeming paradox of adopting a member of the
murderer's family in settlement of the vengeance claim.
Today money penalties or fines in the criminal law violate our sense
of justice, because they do not represent equal burdens on rich and poor.
There is an old story of a nobleman who brutally assaulted a poor man
and when convicted had to pay what was to the nobleman a relatively
small fine. When he smiled derisively and expressed great satisfaction
at the outcome, the poor man was moved to make some uncomplimentary
remark as to the justice of the legal system which encouraged such an
outrage, whereupon he was adjudged in contempt of court and sent to
jail, to the great detriment of his wife and children.
In brief, money damages mean imprisonment for the poor and release
for the rich.
Another ethical question which may be raised in regard to fines is:
to whom shall the fine go? To the state or to the victim of the crime?
Under the old English procedure, any private person could bring a crim-
inal action and recover the part of the fine that did not go to the crown.
But this partnership between the state and a private person for the col-
lection of a fine seems to many not conducive to a dignified administration
of justice.
Imprisonment. Imprisonment, originally a mere matter of detention
until a debt be paid or a trial determined, has now become the most usual
punishment for all crimes, except the lighter misdemeanors for which
fines are generally collected. Its horrors so cry to heaven that no one
ventures to say anything in defense of the system. Still it maintains itself
because despite the various associations of benevolent men and women
interested in prison reform, and the writings of psychologists and other
students of penology, no practicable alternative has been worked out.
A few things stand out unmistakably: some may perhaps discount the
accounts of the horrible sexual and other perverse conditions which pre-
vail when we segregate a number of male or female criminals and deprive
them of most of the humanizing influence that normally operate on us.
After all, they may say, it is unfortunately true that most of these con-
ditions exist also outside of prison walls. But no one denies that our
prisons are the great schools of crime, that many who are committed for
minor offenses learn from their associates more cunning and brutal ways.
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No one can dispute the depressing figures which show the large number
of criminal offenders that have already served some prison term. The
efforts of noble men to preach that imprisonment should be a preparation
for the later free life come to naught, for they do not tell us how that
consmation can be brought about. It is difficult to work out any plan
which will actually succeed in reforming even young offenders who are
sent to our reformatories. And even if we do succeed in educating pris-
oners and preparing them for some useful work, how can we guarantee
them opportunity for employment, especially when millions of men with-
out such blemishes on their records are out of work? While we may
minimize, we cannot deny the fact that a prison record is a handicap in
applying for a responsible position.
But when all this and much more is admitted, what feasible alternative
have we to our prison system? Shall we shut up our prisons and let
robbers, gunmen, and various fiends freely prey on innocent men, women
and children? Imprisonment does prevent people from committing such
outrages, at least so long as they are incarcerated. And while the deter-
rent effect of imprisonment may be small, it cannot, in the light of human
experience, be denied or regarded as nil.
The foregoing reflections in no way militate against the effort to im-
prove prison conditions and to help to save the human beings who get
caught in the meshes of the criminal law. But it is well to realize diffi-
culties that cannot be removed merely by good intentions. Many pro-
posals for reform are altogether unobjectionable except for the external
conditions that interfere with their effectiveness. There is obvious justice,
for instance, in the proposal that the criminal be compelled to work to pay
the victim of his crime for at least a part of the loss he has imposed on
him. But to allow prison labor to compete with free labor would be hor-
ribly detrimental to the latter.
There is more merit in the proposal that the state should compensate
the innocent victim of a wrongful conviction and imprisonment, just as
wrongful fines and tax collections are refunded. But though this has been
more or less successfully tried in several countries, the practical difficulties
of assessing the money equivalent of all that is involved prevents the
justice of this proposal from finding greater appeal.
On the whole, the problem of imprisonment and in general of punishing
those who violate the law is one of the most disheartening ones that face
modern civilization. It represents the breakdown of human intelligence
as well as good will. It shows perhaps the ugliest phase of our human
nature, even if we should attribute it all to our economic system or to
any other deus ex machiihu.
The criminal law represents the pathology of civilization. But just
as the study of animal pathology has illumined normal physiology, and
has been helpful in physical hygiene, or just as the study of insanity has
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thrown light on mental processes and has been at times somewhat helpful
in mental hygiene, so the study of criminality may illumine normal human
motives and be helpful in bringing about just humane social relations.
The necessary conditions for this study, however, is the most rigorous,
intellectual integrity, the concentration on seeing the facts as they are,
regardless of natural sentimental predilections. We must learn to live
in an imperfect world, though we dare not relax the effort to make it
better.
